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The missteps of past interagency coordination evolutions have been analyzed and the lessons learned have been incorporated into joint doctrine. This doctrine has been institutionalized and is use in Afghanistan. While the area is still a war zone, the process of working towards the rebuilding of Afgha s progressing. Some improvements in the interagency process include: creation of an Office of International Assistance to coordinate the strategic visi nteragency operations, increased liaison between CINC staffs and UN standing coordination cells and increased active duty Civil Affairs Officers to en CMOCs are adequately staffed.

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**Naval War College
Newport, Rhode Island**



**THE CURRENT CIVIL-MILITARY ARRANGEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN:
ADEQUATE FOR THE TASK AT HAND**

By
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Seminar #10

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Joint Military Operations Department.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

January 10, 2002

Paper Advised by: Professor John R. Ballard
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Abstract of:
THE CURRENT CIVIL-MILITARY ARRANGEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN:
ADEQUATE FOR THE TASK AT HAND

Civil-Military operations doctrine has been developed and institutionalized since the dysfunction of the 1960s through the 1980s. The lessons learned from earlier attempts at interagency coordination have been incorporated into current doctrine.

CINCCENT has incorporated doctrine for interagency coordination and is providing timely information and logistics assistance where it can and it appears that the humanitarian portion of the operation is increasing the food and basic human necessities to the needy in Afghanistan.

An office that coordinates the efforts of the U.S. government similar to the newly created Office of Homeland Defense could more readily unify all aspects of American national power to assist developing crises worldwide. This office could provide a long-range roadmap that would replace the normal crisis action planning that takes place with deliberate planning in most cases.

Additionally, more active duty Civil Affairs specialists are required to support the growing number of humanitarian assistance requirements. More officers would increase the speed of response of these specialists in theater as well as prior coordination at the HACC or Humanitarian Assistance Working Group. The unity of effort among all the organizations will lessen the requirements for every organization, including the active duty military component.

“When the United States undertakes military operations, the Armed Forces of the United States are only one component of a national-level effort involving the various instruments of national power ...Unity of effort –directed and arranged at the national level –is critical.”

Joint Pub 1 Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States

Introduction

The United States of America is engaged in a global war against terrorism. The current operational theater is the failed state of Afghanistan. The United States Central Command (CENTCOM) is the operational commander in the theater. Doctrine for achieving unity of action between all aspects of United States national power exists in current publications, evolving continuously throughout the last decade. The current conflict is again testing that doctrine. CENTCOM has incorporated joint doctrine for interagency coordination into its war effort. While there is room for improvement, the level of effort thus far has provided sufficient unity of effort by coordinating the majority of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and international organizations (IOs).

Definitions

A nongovernmental organization is a group of private individuals that "maintain a consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations."¹ These organizations can be professional organizations, foundations, transnational business groups, or just individuals who share a common goal with respect to humanitarian assistance. These organizations are normally non-U.S. based

organizations.² Private Volunteer Organizations (PVOs) are exactly what their title portends, groups that rely solely on charitable donations. For this paper, PVOs will be included in the acronym NGO. These organizations include Doctors Without Borders, Catholic Relief Services, Save the Children and other similar organizations. An international organization (IO) has global influence and global reach. International organizations include the United Nations (UN), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and other such internationally recognized bodies.

Historical Evolution Of Interagency Dysfunction And Successes

The armed forces have worked in the realm of civilian support since at least the 18th century. Military doctors and engineers traditionally have been at the forefront of these efforts. "Bridge builders and road developers such as John Fremont and pioneers in public health such as Walter Reed laid the foundation for the emergence of the United States as a world power in the 20th Century."³ The first modern effort into a coordinated civil-military action was in South Korea after World War II.⁴ The emphasis was on building schools, hospitals, civic buildings, and transportation infrastructure. This program utilized engineering expertise and supplies from America and relied on Korean labor and local material. It was so successful that the Armed Forces Assistance to Korea (AFAK) became the moniker for similar forays in other countries. Congress saw the utility of this effort and funded studies of the utility of these types of programs.⁵

Yet, efforts to emulate the success in Korea in the Republic of Vietnam were unsuccessful. By not following the tenets established in Korea, it became less of a advising and assisting campaign to one of overt humanitarian assistance. While humanitarian assistance is laudable, it prevents a return on the investment and like the old adage, it only "gives them fish, not teaches them to fish." Additionally, the military civic action was generally seen as only assisting certain pockets of the population, not the country as a whole. This did not assist the host government in building faith and trust in its population and did not help quell the insurrection.⁶

Additionally, the forays into Grenada and Panama were further examples of the military providing its forces and individual humanitarian organizations providing support in an uncoordinated fashion. Military civic action was generally associated with counter-insurgency operations. Hence, they were never fully integrated into the entire population, only certain segments. While the military possesses great civil engineers and medical professionals, it is less suited for nation building. Warfighters traditionally disdain nation building and are not trained for it. Civil affairs professionals are a very small minority of the armed forces and the average soldier receives limited training in the skills required for nation building. NGOs and IOs are infinitely better suited at providing humanitarian assistance to populations. Prior to the 1990s, NGOs/PVOs and military organizations may have worked in the same country, even the same area, but rarely worked together. It wasn't until after 1990 that they truly became a force multiplier. "According to one recent article, there are some 14,500 NGOs."⁷ Additionally, NGOs "provide assistance to over 250 million

people annually. Their worldwide contributions total between \$9 and \$10 billion each year-more than any single nation or international body (such as the UN).”⁸

The massive support NGOs provided in post-Desert Storm Iraq during Operation Provide Comfort clearly defined the requirement for a central organizational point where NGOs and U.S. government agencies could coordinate their efforts. The increasing number of humanitarian missions and Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) has highlighted the value of this central point of coordination. While Provide Comfort was the first use of the Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC), it has been tested more effectively in Somalia and Haiti.

The Joint Task Force (JTF) in Somalia separated the country into nine sectors and each sector had an established Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC) and each HOC had an imbedded CMOC.⁹ As will normally be the case, the UN had already established HOCs prior to the JTF arriving on scene. The HOC remained under the control of the UN, but the CMOC was under the control of the JTF. This type of arrangement is typical for peace operations. "In theory, the HOC was to be a policy-making body but it had little real authority. The day-to-day coordination and detail work was left to the CMOC."¹⁰

OPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in Haiti had a different intent from the outset. While the original JTF in Somalia was established to support humanitarian efforts, it was not a primary focus of the operation in Haiti. One CMOC was established in the JTF Headquarters in Port-au-Prince with a liaison office located in a Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (HACC). The decision to create the HACC was based on lessons learned from previous humanitarian assistance

evolutions. During earlier CMOC trials, some NGOs were reluctant to become too associated with U.S. military or other U.S. government agencies. The HACC was located near, but not at the Joint Operations Center (JOC). This alleviated the need for NGO personnel to come to the secure JOC. A smaller CMOC was established in Cap-Haitien and was more doctrinally sound, with the CMOC as the point of coordination.¹¹

Each of these evolutions has highlighted the fact that unity of effort can be achieved by harnessing the strengths and enthusiasm of NGOs and IOs. While still suffering from growing pains, each of these evolutions has shown improvement in coordination between NGOs, IOs and the stated military effort. During the 1990s, the doctrine for operations involving interagency coordination was developed and is currently well defined.

Doctrine For Interagency Coordination

“Military operations must be synchronized with those of other agencies of the U.S. Government (USG) as well as with foreign forces, nongovernmental and private voluntary organizations, and regional and international organizations.”¹²

Since the number of evolutions of military involvement in civil activity at home and abroad is increasing, both uniformed military professionals and members of NGOs and IOs are beginning to grasp the idea that a unified effort is preferred when involved in an operation. Unity of effort is difficult to achieve among often-conflicting goals within an operation. Additionally, NGOs may have conflicting policies, procedures and decision-making techniques that do not mesh well with the goals of the Joint Task Force Commander. Most NGOs and IOs have a structure

much more complex than the theater commander. However, these organizations may be drawn to military commanders while in theater because of the need for logistic support and possibly protection for their operations. While often disjointed in the past, there has been a concerted effort in the last ten years to develop and use a doctrine within the military establishment to unify the efforts of all facets of power within a theater of operations. The current doctrine is included in Joint Pub 3-08: Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations.

The process for interagency coordination at the national level is grounded within the U.S. Constitution and established by law in the National Security Act of 1947. The National Security Council members assist the President by advising him on the best use of resources within their areas of responsibility. The Secretary of the Army is the lead Department of Defense (DoD) Executive Agent for military support of civil authorities within the United States. Federal law strictly dictates what level of support the military can give within the confines of the United States when supporting domestic emergencies created by natural or man-made catastrophes.¹³

These limitations are not present when operations in foreign venues arise. However, there are other unique challenges that present themselves. The relationship that exists with the government in a foreign country can have a profound effect on the type of coordination required when working with NGOs and IOs. Within the DoD, there may be bilateral or multilateral military relationships or treaties that may dictate how an evolution may play out. Within a theater of operations, the theater CINC is the DoD's focal point for planning of interagency coordination.

Since NGOs and IOs are not U.S. Government agencies, they do not fall under a specified hierarchy and fall under an associate or partnership relationship with the CINC. Still, these organizations may provide the CINC with valuable resources. Under circumstances that exist in many contingencies, NGOs and IOs will be in theater before U.S. military forces arrive and may be on the ground well after military forces depart. They are often willing to operate in high-risk areas without military support. NGOs are most likely to be workers involved in humanitarian relief operations. These workers are varied, flexible and autonomous.¹⁴ “Because of their capability to respond quickly and effectively to a crisis, NGOs and PVOs can lessen the civil-military resources that a commander would otherwise have to devote to an operation.”¹⁵

The challenge for the operational commander is how to integrate civilian organizations within the military command and control structure. The task can be even more difficult because many NGOs may not seek U.S. military support, due to long-standing distrust or the desire to remain completely separate from military operations. Some NGOs believe that complete neutrality is essential for their mission accomplishment. However, when the NCA directs the military to operate with or in support of NGOs, the goal must be for close coordination between the military and NGOs. Additionally, it is important for the military to enable the NGOs to perform their missions, not perform the missions for them.¹⁶

The lessons that have been learned from the many instances of military intervention in support of humanitarian missions highlighted the necessity of establishing a cell that would function as the coordinating body for military and

NGO/PVO operations. This cell has been designated the Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC).

Joint Pub 3-08 provides a framework for setting up a CMOC; however, it is not directive in nature. This provides the CINC the latitude to shape the cell to maximize productivity and coordination. Additionally, deliberate or crisis action planning should be completed with all the organizations that will be involved. This is intuitively obvious. Coordination and liaison at all levels will assist the CINC in synchronizing his actions with those NGOs and IOs that will also be involved. The most important hurdle to overcome is to identify who will be decision makers at the appropriate levels. Since the hierarchy of NGOs and IOs are substantially different than military units, this is a great challenge. For instance, the UN has both strategic and tactical equivalents with the U.S. military, but no operational level equivalent to assist with advance planning.¹⁷

The next great hurdle is to identify clear and defined objectives that all organizations agree upon. Without agreed upon objectives, the coordination will be difficult at best. It is only when these objectives are defined and then tasks assigned based on these objectives that measures of effectiveness will be available. These objectives will allow different organizations to identify resources that they may bring to the table and also identify shortcomings that others may be able to rectify. This will also assist to decrease or eliminate duplication of effort. It is important to include representatives of the host nation or government, the Department of State (DoS) and embassy personnel affected, officials of all the U.S. Government agencies that will be taking part in the operation, coalition military representatives, NGO and

IO representatives, as well as the representatives of the CINC or JTF commander. These military representatives should nominally include intelligence, logistics (including medical and infrastructure planners), operations, legal, chaplain and civil affairs.¹⁸ The attached diagram is the model of how an effective interagency operation can be organized at the strategic through operational levels (See figure 1).

Interagency Coordination Conditions At The Outbreak of Hostilities In Afghanistan

“Poverty, famine, a devastating drought, and years of war and civil strife have created a humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan, which was aggravated by years of Taliban misrule. The people of the United States, through USAID (U.S. Agency for International Development), have responded.”¹⁹

Even prior to the devastation of September 11, America provided more humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan than any other foreign country. In fiscal year 2002, the President pledged \$320 million to Afghanistan, with over \$180 million already provided, and \$100 million of that through USAID. This arm of the U.S. State Department has provided 39 grants to NGOs working in Afghanistan.²⁰ Joint Pub 3-08 Volume II states that 12 NGOs were continuously operating in the country prior to the outbreak of the current hostilities, including AmeriCares Foundation, CARE, International Catholic Migration Commission, Doctors Without Borders, as well as others. Some elements of the UN, the World Food Program (WFP) and UN Development Program (UNDP) have been in Afghanistan since 1989. The organizations have operated in a hostile environment, which the widely reported imprisonment of aid workers clearly illustrates.

Prior to hostilities, CENTCOM's Humanitarian Assistance (HA) branch had informal liaison with numerous organizations through its headquarters in Tampa, but no field representatives prior to open hostilities in October.²¹ Since the situation on the ground in Afghanistan has changed substantially since early October, the relationship between CENTCOM and NGOs has grown dramatically.

Current Interagency Conditions In Afghanistan

With the establishment of a new government and hands-on involvement of U.S. military personnel, joint doctrine for civil-military interaction has been instituted. A Combined-Joint Civil-Military Task Force (CJCMOTF) has been established. Currently, CENTCOM is providing logistic support and protection for 58 registered NGOs/IOs in Afghanistan. NGO presence in Afghanistan varies based on their capabilities, so their presence varies from region to region, area to area, even locality to locality. Collectively, all of the major population centers have one or more representatives from a NGO.²²

While the CINC is not *officially* responsible for generating unity of effort with all government agencies (it is beyond the scope of a combat mission), he is the most likely source for supporting all organizations. His support staff is the largest and has the ability to bring in the infrastructure needed to support large areas. This provides the CINC leverage to have great influence in the country. A supporting role for the HA mission is institutionalized through the following process.²³ Any NGO or IO can produce a document called a RFA (Request for Assistance) to the Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cells (CHLC) or CMOC. Currently in Afghanistan, the UN is

the lead IO and USAID is the lead agency for the U.S. government for HA.

CENTCOM is strictly in a supporting role. On the national level, NGOs are meeting three times a week in the UN-led Humanitarian Assistance Coordinating Committee (HACC). This committee is located in Atlanta, GA. There are CHLCs in major cities in Afghanistan as well as major supporting logistics hubs in Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. The UN is currently the lead agent in coordinating these efforts.²⁴

Since NGOs are truly non-governmental and the government cannot direct them to act or react a certain way, it must attempt to influence them in other ways. The most readily available method is by the donor process. A panel of donors must approve every operation in most NGOs. If the government wants a NGO to accomplish some mission, it can donate sufficient resources to become a member of the panel that approves the 'operation.' Governmental organizations like USAID come into play in many instances, and specifically in Afghanistan.

Given that the CINC is not empowered to direct a NGO in any way, he can only influence and suggest direction and venues and assist NGOs in theater. One method of influence the CINC has at his disposal is by providing NGOs information. In Afghanistan, the CINC is providing weather advisories and security risk assessments. Currently, the CINC is providing major logistic support in the way of major aircraft lift in theater. The military can also providing technical analysis and advice in civil engineering, public sanitation and hygiene, and veterinary science, animal husbandry and basic infrastructure construction. The armed forces can also provide mine and unexploded ordnance clearance and disposal. Additionally, the CINC can provide basic security in the way of convoy escort and refugee camp perimeter guards. While

the UN mandate for support in Afghanistan is not currently published, the Peacekeeping force can be expected to perform many of these functions.²⁵ As reported in the media, the forces in Afghanistan are performing basic security functions and as mentioned, assisting with the logistics. Once the humanitarian supplies arrive at the major UN logistics hub via military or commercial airlift, they are being trucked into theater by contracted private commercial transports. NGOs have 2000 trucks on contract at this point.²⁶

The security and airlift support provided by CENTCOM has benefited the HA effort. Ms. Carolyn McAskie, the UN Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator for Afghanistan, stated that the most important constraint facing the HA effort was the insecurity of the area as well as the inability to have a reliable airlift capability in Afghanistan. She stated that she was looking forward to working with the UN Peacekeepers or an indigenous police force, when it was established. Other NGO/IOs, notably the ICRC and the World Food Program, were confident the situation on the ground was improving and that supplies were flowing.²⁷

The CINC has civil affairs officers on the ground in Afghanistan. Additionally, there are numerous reservists who fill the CA billets both at CENTCOM in the policy division and at the CJCMOTF. There are numerous CMOCs established with plans for more to be established, as the operation require.

It appears that the question that needs to be answered for the CINC is when to implement the civil affairs organization. At what phase of an operation should a CMOC be established? The published doctrine provides no insight on the timing. As a conflict progresses along the continuum of peace to violence to peace, the timing is

important. Since civil authorities and NGOs will be in place long before the military arrives and unless the mission is strictly humanitarian, the violence must be subdued before large humanitarian assistance can be provided.²⁸ However, the doctrine clearly articulates that planning should begin well before the CMOC is established. It appears that the CMOC should be established when the CINC can begin to support the humanitarian mission. This will ease the transition from militarily to civilly influenced solutions, where the long-term solutions exist.

Recommendations For Improvement

While it appears the interagency coordination is light years ahead of where it was 10 short years ago, coordination can be improved upon. The area that can be improved upon the most is coordination at the strategic level. There appears to be little prior coordination between major U.S. agencies at the national strategic level. While NGO/IOs are coordinating prior to entering into an operation at the HACC, the major executive departments do not appear to coordinate for *long term* planning. President Bush abolished all *ad hoc* organizations at the National Security Council level in March 2001, including interagency working groups. In their place, National Security Agency Deputies Committees were institutionalized. Working under this group are Policy Coordinating Councils. They meet as needed to develop and recommend policy changes and are organized into geographic regions.²⁹ The President should create a coordinating agency whose function is to coordinate all the elements of national power on a *permanent* basis with the focus on long term planning. This new coordinating body, possibly called the Office of International

Assistance, could be modeled after the Office of Homeland Security. The charter would be to coordinate the efforts of the Departments of Defense, State, Justice, Treasury, and other departments as required (if Congress was interested, representatives as well). This entity could create regional Conceptual Plans (CONPLANS), providing “off-the-shelf” templates to assist planners when a calamity strikes. The Generic POL-MIL Plan disseminated in President Clinton’s Decision Directive-56 provides a good template on how to organize these “off-the-shelf” policy CONPLANS.³⁰ Additionally, this body could provide planning guidance to the CINC when developing the Theater Engagement Plan. If regional expertise is required from the military, the JCS could supply information as needed. The CINC could also provide insight if required. Deliberate planning is always preferable to crisis action planning.

Another area of improvement is to institutionalize CINC participation in the HAAC. This is more a function of manpower rather than desire. If the CINC is aware of the NGO/IOs needs in advance, it will allow him to better address these needs in advance, increasing synergy and unity of effort. As always, the CINC’s warfighting requirements will be the highest priority. The HAAC and the UN led Humanitarian Assistance Working Group is where the newly created Office of International Assistance would plug into the NGO/IO process. This is where the U.S. government can best advise and influence the NGO/IO decision-making process.

Another development in interagency coordination is US Pacific Command’s Center of Excellence. This organization is a standing think-tank that provides a forum to exercise and plan humanitarian relief and disaster response for both military

and NGO representatives. This is especially useful in an organization that is not located in the continental United States. This type of organization is not deemed necessary at CENTCOM or other commands located within the continent, as these entities have direct and timely access to the levers of national power in Washington as well as the headquarters of most NGOs. It would appear that the Center Of Excellence is ideally suited for planning disaster or humanitarian relief and building of trust and confidence between NGOs and the military, but less suited for planning of phasing from hostilities to post hostilities. An ideal location for another “center of excellence” would be EUCOM, where the distance from Washington DC is also great.

Finally, civil affairs manpower is an issue. Both the Army and Marines have active duty Civil Affairs Officers. However, the bulk of the Civil Affairs specialists are reservists. One advantage of having Civil Affairs Officers in reserve status is when the President calls up reserves, it provides potential adversaries and allies alike, tangible proof of U.S. commitment to the operation. Additionally, Civil Affairs Officers have a small logistics footprint and are more easily mobilized. While calling up reserve Civil Affairs Officers is sufficient in a major theater war scenario, where there will be time to mobilize, it is insufficient in the operations that have been undertaken in the last 10 years. As the war on terrorism continues, there will be plenty of work for Civil Affairs Officers. It is likely that operations against terrorist cells will take the U.S. to other failed states, where civil-military operations will be called on again and again. There may be insufficient numbers of Civil Affairs Officers. Additionally, America’s 911 force, the Marine Corps, have many less Civil

Affairs specialists. When a smaller MAGTF deploys, they often do not have Civil Affairs Officers on the Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD).³¹ This means that Marines who are under-trained in civil affairs skills will be the first on-scene. While early coordination with a CINC will allow Civil Affairs Officers sent to the theater to assist, this would not be immediate in most cases. An increased number of active duty Civil Affairs Officers can ease the burden on the reservists both in the Army and Marine Corps.

Conclusion

Civil-Military operations doctrine has been developed and institutionalized since the dysfunction of the 1960s through the 1980s. The lessons learned from earlier attempts at interagency coordination have been incorporated into current doctrine. It appears at this new stage of the almost thirty years of hostilities in Afghanistan that the civil affairs portion of CINCCENT's mission is progressing as doctrine dictates. The CINC is providing timely information and logistics assistance where it can and it appears that the humanitarian portion of the operation is increasing the food and basic human necessities to the needy in Afghanistan. CMOCs are up and running in theater, providing the vital link between the military component and NGOs and IOs in country.

As the hostilities phase subsides and the post-hostilities phase begins, the coordination between the UN Peacekeepers and NGOs will increase and the real test of the organization and lessons learned from previous civil-military evolutions will become more apparent.

The CINC is working with NGOs and the IOs in an attempt to achieve unity of effort. The NGO/IO coordination is working at the international level, but improvement is possible at the national strategic level. An office that coordinates the efforts of the U.S. government similar to the newly created Office of Homeland Defense could more readily unify all aspects of American national power to assist developing humanitarian crises worldwide. This office could provide a long-range roadmap that would replace the normal crisis action planning that takes place with deliberate planning in most cases. This would supply the CINC with the strategic vision, a Commander's Intent on a national level, to assist in harnessing all the available resources in his area of responsibility. This would assist the CINC in influencing the direction that NGOs and IOs accomplish their mission.

Additionally, more active duty Civil Affairs specialists can only help a CINC coordinate with all other resources in theater, decreasing the CA burden on warfighters. More officers would increase the speed of response of these specialists in theater as well as prior coordination at the HACC or Humanitarian Assistance Working Group. The unity of effort among all the organizations will lessen the requirements for every organization, including the active duty military component.

It is gratifying to see that the great strides being made in joint warfare are also being made in interagency coordination. While this appears to be a success story in the making, one can see how a long term, well thought out and articulated plan for harnessing all components of national power can only assist in creating unity of effort and assist in preventing crisis action planning.




Figure III-2. Model for Coordination Between Military and Nonmilitary Organizations - Foreign Operations

III-7

Figure 1 taken from JP 3-08 Volume I

Notes

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- ¹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations Volume I*, Joint Pub 3-08 (Washington, DC: 9 October 1996), p. GL-10
- ² Ibid, p. GL-10
- ³ John De Pauw and George A. Luz, *Winning the Peace: The Strategic Implications of Military Civic Action*, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1990, p. 10.
- ⁴ Ibid, p. 10.
- ⁵ Ibid, p. 10.
- ⁶ Ibid, pp. 12-14.
- ⁷ Mark A. Davis, *Tracing the Evolution of the Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) In The 90s: What Is The Best Model?*, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1996, p. 6.
- ⁸ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations Volume I*, Joint Pub 3-08 (Washington, DC: 9 October 1996), p. II-18.
- ⁹ Mark A. Davis, *Tracing the Evolution of the Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) In The 90s: What Is The Best Model?*, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1996, p. 36.
- ¹⁰ Ibid, pp. 35-36.
- ¹¹ Ibid, pp. 45-50.
- ¹² Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations Volume I*, Joint Pub 3-08 (Washington, DC: 9 October 1996), p. I-1.
- ¹³ Ibid, p. vii.
- ¹⁴ Ibid, pp. vi-viii.
- ¹⁵ Ibid, p. viii.
- ¹⁶ Ibid, p. II-20.
- ¹⁷ Ibid, p. II-22.
- ¹⁸ Ibid, pp. III-1 through III-11.
- ¹⁹ Humanitarian Crisis In Central Asia, U.S.AID Website <<http://www.usaid.gov/about/afghanistan>>, 12/20/01, p. 1
- ²⁰ Ibid, p. 1
- ²¹ Harrison, Wayne J. CENTOM CCJ5-O, phone interview with author, 17 December 2001.
- ²² Sinnott, Anthony D, <sinnotad@centcom.smil.mil> "Request for Information" {email to Robert Geis <geisr@nwc.navy.smil.mil>} 14 December 2001, p. 2
- ²³ Ibid, p. 1.
- ²⁴ Ibid, pp. 2-3.
- ²⁵ Ibid, p. 4.
- ²⁶ Ibid, p. 4.
- ²⁷ Press Briefing On Afghanistan By Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator, <http://www.un.org/news/briefings/doc/2001/mcaskiebrf2.doc.htm>, 06 December, 2001, p. 1
- ²⁸ Sinnott, Anthony D, <sinnotad@centcom.smil.mil> "RE: RFI" {email to Robert Geis <geisr@nwc.navy.smil.mil>} 14 December 2001, p. 7.
- ²⁹ President, National Security Presidential Directive-1, "Organization of the National Security Council System," (March 2001), pp. 2-3.
- ³⁰ President, Presidential Decision Directive, "The Clinton Administration's Policy On Managing Complex Contingency Operations: Presidential Decision Directive-56" (May 1997) pp. Appendix B, 1-24.
- ³¹ Sinnott, Anthony D, <sinnotad@centcom.smil.mil> "Civil-Military Operations for Expeditionary Forces, PowerPoint presentation." {email to Robert Geis <geisr@nwc.navy.smil.mil>} 14 December 2001, p. 14.

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